(available at <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/05-364.htm>), notwithstanding an amicus curiae brief filed by the European Commission supporting this petition, which stated: ʺWe argue that the Federal Circuit went too far by construing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act to make considerations of compliance with international obligations completely irrelevant in construing a Department of Commerce antidumping determination, and further argue that the Departmentʹs ʹzeroingʹ methodology -held invalid by both a WTO Appellate Body and a NAFTA Binational Panel -is not entitled to Chevron deference because it would bring the United States into noncompliance with treaty obligations.ʺ (available at <http://www.robbinsrussel.com/pdf/265/pdf>) ever more widespread in constitutional, democratic and judicial discourse. 5 Modern constitutional democracies in Europe and North-America accept that protection of constitutional citizen rights requires judicial protection against democratic majority politics so as to limit abuses of legislative and executive powers. 6 In Europe, this conception of law, politics and courts as constitutionally limited, democratic processes requiring "checks and balances" between legislative, executive and "judicial governance" has been extended also to predictability to the multilateral trading system" 9 and provides for compulsory jurisdiction of independent, national as well as international dispute settlement procedures 10 with the mandate, inter alia, "to clarify the existing provisions of basic principles … underlying this multilateral trading system"? 12 How should such principles be legally defined in order to provide legal security not only for governments but also for their citizens engaged in international trade?
This chapter argues that the universal recognition of human rights -for example, in the UN Charter, in the law of other worldwide and regional organizations (such as the International Labor Organization, the World Health Organization, the EU), international human rights conventions, international customary law, in national laws and constitutions as well as "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations" 13 -requires WTO judges, like domestic judges inside constitutional democracies, to interpret international trade law not only in conformity with "inter-state principles of justice" (like principles of "due process of law" and procedural justice in dispute settlement proceedings among states). As goods and services are produced, traded and consumed primarily by citizens rather than by governments, and trade regulation directly affects private rights and private interests, judges also have to examine whether "the basic principles … underlying this multilateral trading system" require judges to take into account the "intra-state functions" of international trade law to protect legal security for those engaged in international trade, for instance by interpreting 
II. International integration law and ʺprinciples of justiceʺ call for judicial protection of individual rights
According to the International Court of Justice, "an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation." 37 The judicial task of settling disputes over the interpretation of international treaties "in conformity with principles of justice and international law" (Preamble VCLT) therefore requires taking into account that the more than 250 with stronger legal and judicial "checks and balances". 46 The customary rules of international treaty interpretation acknowledge that the textual, contextual, teleological and historical approaches to clarifying the "ordinary meaning" (Art. assert legal supremacy not only vis-à-vis domestic laws; 52 they also introduce vertical legal hierarchies and constitutional ʺchecks and balancesʺ among the institutions and different levels of primary and secondary law of international organizations. 53 In addition, they increasingly limit regional agreements, 54 bilateral agreements, 55 
2.
Implications for the jurisdiction of WTO dispute settlement bodies and for the principles underlying the WTO legal system
As the WTO dispute settlement system "serves to preserve the rights and intellectual property rights) and WTO dispute settlement rulings in their domestic courts would benefit not only EC and US citizens, but would offer much needed leadership for strengthening the rule of law in international trade, for depoliticizing agreed categories of WTO disputes, and for making multilevel governance for the collective supply of international public goods more coherent and more effective.
Legal and judicial remedies against violations of WTO rules remain inadequate

V. Conclusion
In judgments that must be scrutinized by "deliberative democracy" and "judicial discourse" among national and international judges. WTO dispute settlement rulings justify "legitimate expectations" 112 that must be respected not only by WTO judges but also in disputes over the domestic implementation of legally binding WTO dispute settlement rulings.
Multilevel governance, including multilevel judicial governance, is a precondition for the collective supply of global public goods like international rule of law and a mutually beneficial, worldwide division of labor. The mercantilist EC and US double standards for judicial clarification and enforcement of WTO rules abroad, and for preventing their domestic courts from applying WTO law, need to be limited by reciprocal, political commitments to stronger judicial protection of rule of law "providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system" (Article 3 DSU). As the single "international constitutional democracy", the European Communities should take the lead to further strengthen and "civilize" the WTO dispute settlement system and to prevent, decentralize, and depoliticize intergovernmental trade disputes by providing stronger domestic legal and judicial remedies. The power-oriented, "reasonable" 113 , respect for WTO rules and the domestic enforcement of WTO dispute settlement rulings will remain contested in WTO Members. Without more coherent legal and judicial protection of rule of international law and of a more just WTO trading system, the Charming Betsy 114 is likely to sink further into oblivion, and citizens will trust neither the WTO legal system nor its democratic legitimacy.-113 See the criticism by Davies (note 21) of US court decisions applying the 'Chevron doctrine' as limiting the judicial function also in respect of administrative interpretations that have been found in legally binding WTO dispute settlement rulings to violate the WTO obligations of the US: "US courts are unlikely to align their views with those of the WTO tribunals" (at 126), as illustrated by the various US court cases discussed by Davies. From 1995 up to the spring of 2006, the United States had 30 and the European Communities had 14 adverse WTO dispute settlement findings of violations of their respective WTO obligations. Both have tended to comply in cases concerning administrative measures. Amending WTO-inconsistent legislation has, however, proven to be politically more difficult, and several ʺcompliance panelsʺ (pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU) found that some of the legislative remedial measures continued to violate WTO obligations (for example, concerning US antidumping and subsidy practices, EC import restrictions on bananas and hormone-fed beef).
114 Alexander Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 US 64 (1804) 118, ʺAn act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .ʺ
